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CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
CONCEPT AND THE INSTITUTION. By Charles Donahue, Jr., Thomas

E. Kauper, and Peter W. Martin. St. Paul: West. 1974. Pp. lxiii,
1501. $22.50.
The title of their casebook-Property: An Introduction to the
Concept and the Institution-suggests the formidable task that Professors Donahue, Kauper, and Martin have set themselves. It is a
task they have performed with enthusiasm, and the book they have
produced is positively exuberant, overflowing with intellectual vitality and excitement. There are certain pedagogical advantages to
be gained from intellectual enthusiasm, not least of which is that
it is so often contagious.
Apart from the task of arousing intellectual energy, however,
there are three distinct but related problems that confront the
writer of a first-year casebook on property. The first is how to impose thematic unity upon the disparate legal questions that inhere
in the property course.1 The solution of this problem is not markedly advanced by the fact that one can describe, in an admittedly
general but nevertheless accurate manner, the substantive content
of the usual property course as the legal relationship among persons with respect to things. The very generality of the description is
necessary to its accuracy, which perhaps indicates that both the concepts and the social realities investigated in the course are so multifarious that only when very broadly conceived can they be seen to
have a logical connection with one another. Possession of wild animals and gifts of personal property, for example, are two topics that
are often covered in the "personal property" aspect of the course.
These topics both deal ·with the legal relationships of persons to
things; in a conceptual sense they are somewhat unified by a common concern about "dominion and control." Apart from that bond,
however, there is little obvious logical relationship between them.
More importantly, the social realities to which the law of these two
topics is addressed apparently raise different policy questions.
A similar lack of logical connection characterizes the topics
covered in the real property segment of the course. Again, the social
phenomena that call upon the law for resolution raise policy questions that are more apparently different than obviously similar.
Apart from being somehow "about" people and their relationship
to Blackacre, what has the law of estates in land to do with the law
of nuisance, that of adverse possession with that of zoning, that of
1. See Tarlock, Book Review, 21 STAN. L. R.Ev. 1266, 1276 (1969).
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recording acts and title insurance with that of waste, that of landlord and tenant relationships with that of conveyancing?
Thus, the first task of a writer on property is to find the hidden
thread that binds these topics together-or rather to weave a pattern
into which they all comfortably fit. This organized pattern or principle will reflect an author's pedagogical priorities. For example, an
author might unify his book simply by making it responsive to curricular needs as he perceives them.2 Or he might impose a pattern
on the material by taking a consistently functional or problem approach,8 instead of a conceptual one. Or he might organize his
material around one or another of the social processes-land development,4 for example-with which the usual property course is only
partially concerned. The point is that an organizational principle
must be embraced, a unifying theme chosen.
The second issue that the writer of a first-year property casebook
must face is the choice of topics to be covered. There is no uniformity of view about the curricular needs that the course ought to
meet.5 The answer may be dictated by the author's choice of unifying theme; a number of books, for example, have sought thematic
unity simply by adopting a unique and coherent view of the topics
that should be covered.6 But the choice of unifying theme will not
always imply the topics to be covered and, in any event, the issue of
coverage must be resolved.
The third problem that confronts the author is how to accomplish the most basic tasks of the first year-the elucidation of doctrinal concepts and the development of the analytical skills that are
the first requisites to practicing law. Are cases and statutes, presented
in the traditional format, to be the principal vehicles for conveying
substantive information and encouraging analytical effort? Or is
the problem method more effective? How much textual exposition
of doctrine should be offered? How much historical material should
be presented? What kinds of questions should be integrated into the
materials? By whatever organizing principle is chosen to guide the
arrangement and presentation of materials, by whatever criteria one
selects the topics to be covered, there is no escape from the necessity
to confront the relevant legal doctrine. And surely the development
of analytical skills so informs the function of the first year that it
must be an implicit aspect of nearly every choice made by first-year
casebook ·writers.
2. E.g., C. BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE (1968).
3. E.g., E. RABIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF MoDERN REAL PROPERTY LAW (1974).
4. E.g., G. LEFcoE, LAND DEVELOPMENT LAW (1966).
5. See, e.g., Cribbet, Property in the First Year, 18 J. LEGAL ED. 55 (1965); Jacob,
Book Review, 20 J. LEGAL ED. 873 (1968); Meyers, Book Review, 116 U. PA. L. REv.
742 (1968).
6. E.g., C. BERGER, supra note 2.
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Turning to the manner in which this book has resolved these
three problems, let us look first at the question of thematic unity.
As Professors Donahue, Kauper, and Martin see it, "the tendency
has been to use the commercial transactions in land as the organizing theme for the first-year [property] course" (p. xix). They view
that tendency with alarm, for they see it as placing "too much
-emphasis on commercial land transactions and not enough on property generally, on property as a legal idea and as a set of legal institutions" (p. xix). Emphasis on commercial land transactions seems
to them to foster the misleading idea "that property consists of a
series of detailed and usually incomprehensible rules .. .'' (p. xix).
They purport to adopt instead the organizing principle that "the
first property course ... must be a survey course in which unity is
provided by developing the theme of the c~ncept and institution of
property in as many of its manifestations as can be covered in the
time allowed, without sacrificing depth and subtlety" (p. xix).
The book is faithful to, and to an extent unified by, its purpose
to survey a broad range of property law. Moreover, the intellectual
atmosphere of the book is generally characterized more by the pursuit of abstractions that inhere in a "conceptual" approach than by
an effort to discern the practical operation of legal rules. These
features give the book a certain methodological consistency, but
they do not make the book a thematic whole. Moreover, they contribute little by way of a cure for the book's major defect, which is its
failure to achieve a focused thematic unity in terms of the concept
of property.
It might well be useful-and it is undoubtedly possible-to
organize a first-year property course around a sustained effort to
develop a unified series of systematic generalizations about property
law. Such an effort would indeed encompass significantly more than
the presentation of "a series of detailed and usually incomprehensible rules," qua rules. It would, by its effort to formulate systematic
generalizations about the rules, put integrative force behind "the
concept and institution" of property.
Economic analysis offers an example of one very promising
means by which conceptual coherence could be imposed upon the
subject of property. "The institution of private property, after all,
serves as a linchpin of our economic organization," 7 and the goal
of efficient resource allocation is surely one in terms of which much
of the law of private property-if not, indeed, the very creation of
private rights in property8-can be systematically organized, understood, and evaluated.0 The concept of economic efficiency has been
7. B. ACKERMAN, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW (1975).
8. · See Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 79 AM. EcoN. REV. 347 (1967),

9. See R.

POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW

10-40 (1973).
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criticized for its tendency to lead one to see the world in one-dimensional terms.10 But it seems to me that the efficiency notion has the
important potential for permitting generalizations to proceed in a
context in which, precisely because a conceptual framework is
provided, it is possible to identify and isolate for analytical purposes
other values that compete with efficiency for recognition and implementation. The fault of this book, however, is not that it fails to use
economiG analysis as its organizing principle, but that it fails to
adopt any organizing principle.
That the book fails in this regard seems traceable to two of its
principal aspects. First, it does not pursue a consistent view of "the
concept and institution of property." Second, thematic attention
has not even been concentrated on "property," the authors having
chosen to develop a number of related themes as well.
Instead of providing an overriding framework for a conceptual
view of property, the book offers a smorgasbord of ideas about and
approaches to property rules and rights. Chapter II, for example,
purports to deal with property in an "abstract form" and to "seek a
definition of what is property" (p. xv). In section I, the authors try
to move "toward a definition of property" (p. 155) by comparing
property rights and civil rights, at least to the extent that distinctions benveen the nvo emerge from such constitutional cases as
Shelley v. Kraemer,11 Bell v. Maryland, 12 State v. Shack,13 and Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.14 The section seems ultimately to conclude
that property can be defined so as to focus on the right to exclude
(p. 218). The chapter then slides almost imperceptibly from the descriptive effort to a normative one: It labels as "both classic and
farsighted" (p. 220) an excerpt from the writings of Morris Cohen
that exhorts us not to "overlook the actual fact that dominion over
things is also imperium over our fellow human beings" (p. 221,
emphasis original), and describes as "seminal" the distinction "benveen property for use and property for power" (p. 222). The
authors assert that "[w]hen we get to the distinction between property for use and property for power ... we are getting to the point
of trying to decide what the courts and other authoritative bodies
ought to protect" (p. 223, emphasis original). Why this distinction
gets us to the point of addressing the "oughts" of property law, or
how it helps to resolve normative issues, are questions that the
authors leave not only unanswered but unasked. Instead, the authors
10. See Leif, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA.
L. REv. 451 (1974).
ll. 334 U.S. I (1948).
12. 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
13. 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971).
14. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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point to the undeniable need "to find some outside idea or combination of ideas which may serve as a rationale for according 'property'
protection to some interests and not to others" (p. 223). They purport to begin their search for this idea in the second section of the
chapter, which they announce as being an exploration of "some of
the traditional justifications for property and ... some of the situations in which application of those justifications is at stake" (p. 223).
Before they tum to the traditional justifications for property, however, the authors summarize, by way of a note entitled, "Regulation
of Property in Land," "the policies which guide, or ought to guide,
the formation of property rules in the absence of such broader considerations as civil rights" (p. 223). But the summary is only a description of the myriad of legal problems with which the property
course is concerned. The policy considerations that the summary
claims to reveal seem to call for ad hoc and episodic solutions,
rather than a principled analysis guided by an embracive concept of
property.
Thus, even in the chapter the authors devote to property as an
abstract form, they adopt no framework within which abstractions
about property might usefully proceed. Neither the vague but suggestive dichotomy benveen "property for use" and "property for
power," nor any one or all of the "traditional justifications for
property," nor "the analytic framework for organizing the various
types of property rules" emerges as the conceptual foundation for
the book's study of property. Nor is there, explicitly or implicitly,
the suggestion that such a foundation ought to be laid, that an effort
to understand and evaluate the institution of property in terms of
an overriding generalization would be useful.
The call for the kind of thematic unity that this book fails to
provide does not imply a simplistic, one-dimensional view of the
world. What is implicit is the notion that analytical rigor and
critical insight are not encouraged by a constant shifting ofCc:onceptual perspectives. Because the book provides no overriding conceptual framework, its descriptive efforts bear an uncomfortable
resemblance to a recitation of "detailed and usually incomprehensible rules," and its normative efforts have a discouraging tendency
to degenerate into ad hoc value judgments.
The second aspect of the book's failure to achieve thematic unity
concerns the failure to concentrate on property qua property. In the
nvo Prefaces to the book, one addressed to the student, the other
to the teacher, the authors make explicit their intention to develop
themes apart from the concept and institution of property. To the
student, the authors suggest that
[t]he following list of questions indicates some of the salient themes
of this book:
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(I) What is property? Why should this particular interest be a£.
forded the peculiar constitutional protections granted "property"
rights?
(2) A right is only as good as the means by which a court will enforce it. What alternative remedies are available to vindicate this
right and what effect will the existence of these remedies have on
the behavior of the possessor of the right?
(3) Property law is the law of wealth or lack of it. What economic
forces is the law protecting or thwarting?
(4) To what extent does the personal situation of the parties (bad
guys vs. good guys) control the result in a given case? To what extent should it? [P. xvi.]
To the teacher, the authors suggest that
a principal, even primary, purpose of a first-year course is to introduce
the student to legal method..•. In addition, we think it desirable
that the first-year student begin studying and thinking about certain
aspects of the law which we hope he will continue to study and think
about all his life: the way law develops; the role of the lawyer as advocate, adviser and policy-maker; the relationship between law and
society; and the differences between the Anglo-American and other legal systems. [P. xxi.]
These questions are certainly not irrelevant, and the educational
aims not unworthy. Moreover, they are pursued ·with noticeable,
often infectious, enthusiasm. The problem with this dispersal of
thematic attention lies rather in the fact that the very real intellectual effort that the book generates is spread too thin, over too large
a slice of legal life. It is one thing to hope that first-year students
will come to appreciate that the law is characterized by the continual interaction of seemingly disparate doctrines, the constant
presence of systematic and jurisprudential issues, an unending
variety of analytical approaches, and an inevitable confrontation
with moral and ethical questions. It is quite another thing usefully
to capture all of this extraordinary richness in one book that purports to be concerned principally with the concept and institution
of property.
That the themes and topics that compete for a student's attention in this book are almost incredibly varied and broad-ranging is
perhaps indicated by a summary of one typical chapter. The first
chapter of the book is entitled, "Establishing the Distinction between Meus and Tuus." Its 154 pages are divided into five sections.
The first four sections-on possession and wild animals, legal consequences of the label "possession," bailment, and adverse possession-cover fairly conventional, introductory doctrinal and legal
ground. The fifth section, called, "Getting a Perspective on Pos-
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session," contains 13 pages of "some philosophy, some history, some
comparative law, and some analysis" (p. 142), principally in the
form of excerpts from and questions on the views of Pollock and
Maitland, Blackstone, Maine, and Holmes.
In the first four sections, cases combined with the authors' provocative questions and pointed textual notes present excellent opportunities for developing nascent analytical skills and elucidating
legal doctrine. In addition, there is a substantial amount of textual
material and numerous questions that raise significant jurisprudential issues. A list of some of the topics covered by the supplementary
textual notes hints at the breadth of concerns that the student is
invited to consider in connection with the principal cases: The
notes cover, inter alia, forms, ·writs, and procedural matters; the
reception into the American legal system of the English common
law; the reporting of cases; double jeopardy and government
appeals; property crimes; game laws; the history of English actions
to recover personal property; actions to recover personal property;
actions to recover real property; burden of proof and presumptions;
Hohfeldian analysis; prescriptive easements; and adverse possession
of chattels.
The questions that are integrated into the supplementary notes
cover equally broad ground-to recount even a substantial number
of them would tiresomely prolong this review. It may suggest the
typically ambitious character of the inquiries to note that a twocolumn summary of double jeopardy, which appears in the first
chapter of this property casebook, is followed by two paragraphs of
questions in which the student is asked to judge the constitutionality of an Ohio statute that permits the state to appeal a criminal
case for the purpose of establishing the law at issue, to compare that
statute with the Federal Criminal Appeals Act, to evaluate the two
statutes "in the light of the notion that judges should only decide
'live' cases," and to probe the issue of whether the separate trial of
defendants is an administrative abuse of the criminal process by the
prosecutor's office (p. 24)1 However provocative such questions may
be, however informative the supplementary notes, it is my view that
they pose insurmountable obstacles to the achievement of the
focused attention and depth of understanding indicative of a book
upon which thematic unity has been successfully imposed.
With respect to the second issue that first-year casebook writers
must resolve, subject-matter inclusion, this book successfully surveys
a significant amount of property law. The authors have included
some material on nearly all of the topics conceivably relevant to the
burgeoning property course: from possession of wild animals to
future interests and the rule against perpetuities, from gifts of
personal property to public control of land use and the basics of
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water law and oil and gas law. Substantial coverage is given to landlord and tenant law, with modem developments well integrated
into the materials, as well as to private use rights comprehended in
the law of nuisance, covenants, and easements. Commercial aspects
of real estate development-vendor and purchaser rights, mortgages and other financing devices, recording acts and title protection
-are telescoped into a short but remarkably thorough concluding
chapter.
Those who believe that the commerdal aspects of property law
are either the appropriate organizing theme for the course or at
least the proper focus of significant analytical concern will be unsatisfied with the book's coverage. This is as it should be; the
authors' rejection of such an eIJ?.phasis was deliberate and integral
to their view of the proper aims of the course. This review will not
dwell further on the question whether the authors are correct in
their choice of emphasis: Those who think they are wrong are likely
to dismiss the book from serious consideration anyway, and those
who think they are right will no doubt be more concerned with
the book's execution of its premises. Suffice it to say that the authors
have achieved their aim to present materials covering many manifestations of property law in a context that deemphasize~ but does
not omit commercial aspects of land development. Within this context the book offers the opportunity to satisfy a wide variety of
topical preferences.
The third issue that faces casebook writers, that of performing
the twin tasks of doctrinal elucidation and analytical training, is
resolved in a manner significantly different from that of other books
in the field. The authors have not relied solely on traditional casebook materials. Although cases are used to sound major doctrinal
themes and to offer significant opportunities for analysis, they probably comprise less than half of the book's contents. Extensive background materials appear in many forms. The authors have written
extensive textual notes; they have reprinted often lengthy excerpts
from the expository and analytical ·writings of others; they have
included many statutes, uniform acts, and samples of pertinent
documents. Integrated into these background materials is a multitude of questions that seek to evoke analysis of or to exhort critical _
thought about the problems that the materials raise. Critical
thought is further encouraged by the occasional appearance of a
"problem" that raises analytical points analogous to those covered
by the materials.
The notes are reasonably successful in imparting information
about historical development and doctrinal content. Additionally,
they generate a sense of immediacy and relevance by placing legal
problems in their contemporary setting and noting the direction
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of and often the impetus for legal change. The notes provide the
principal vehicle by which the authors execute their design to
"survey" property law; they explore the surface of a broad area
rather than probe in depth a more narrow field. Of course, the risk
of acquiring knowledge by survey is superficiality. Superficial knowledge may have the merit of not being "no knowledge," but superficial legal knowledge has the potential for mischief when
administered in large doses to would-be lavvyers. The authors seem
aware of this risk, and provide constant warnings that their coverage,
while inclusive, is not intended to be comprehensive.
The far more troublesome aspect of the supplementary materials
concerns the questions that are so liberally scattered throughout.
The authors describe the questions as being designed to make the
material "self-teaching'' (pp. xxi, xxii), but the attempted integration of critical inquiry with textual and documentary exposition in
my view fails to evoke productive analytical effort. In part this
failure may be attributed simply to a lack of stylistic consistency.
Sentences that end with question marks pervade the book. Some are
in fact real questions, in the sense that they suggest areas for reflection and analysis. Many more, however, seem designed as topic
sentences indicating the subject matter of the textual paragraphs
that follow. Students engaged in self-teaching may well be excused
for failing to pause and reflect over the "real" questions, because
they assume that the questions will be "answered" later in the text.
The failure to evoke analytical effort, however, is not wholly
susceptible to stylistic cure. In the first place, even the most specific
and well-focused questions are unlikely to induce the active intellectual participation necessary to nurture analytical skill when
based upon textual exposition and abstract discussion. Second, the
questions canvass too broad a range of concerns, from the most
specific to the most general. And there are too many of them. They
reflect the book's basic failure to sustain thematic unity, the result
of which in this context is the dilution of intellectual effort. Third,
some of the questions are so incredibly difficult, and call upon such
a vast body of legal knowledge and jurisprudential insight, that it is
almost impossible to take seriously their invitation to thoughtful
consideration by beginning law students. Is it likely, for example,
that a first-year student-one who has just grappled with the intricacies of Shelley v. Kraemer,15 Bell v. Maryland, 16 State v. Shack,11
and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.18 and been presented with a five15.
16.
17.
18.

334 U.S. 1 (1948).
378 U.S. 226 (1964).
58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971).
392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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page excerpt from title VIII of the Civil Rights Act19 and a textual
exposition of Reitman v. Mulkey 20 and its progeny-will be either
equipped or inclined to expend meaningful intellectual effort on
the following three questions:
(a) On the basis of these cases try to determine what is and is not
constitutionally permissible for a state to do in the fair housing area?
(b) What ought to be the respective roles of private parties,
courts, administrative bodies, and legislatures in the fair housing
area?
(c) Are there grounds for discrimination not covered by federal
legislation which a state could and should prohibit, for example, sex,
presence of children in household, status as welfare recipient, age?
[P. 217.]
Admittedly, there is no one right way to approach any subject in
the law school curriculum, and property is no exception. Some will
find that the chief merit of this book lies in the very scope and
variety of issues that it presents. These authors have put rich resources of knowledge, critical insight, and analytical skills at our disposal; and they have done so with vitality and ·with an infectious
perception of the intricacy and complexity of property law and the
legal system. It seems doubly unfortunate, therefore, to have to
conclude as I do that the book's basic failure to provide an embracive conceptual pattern turns out to be a fundamental flaw.
Without such a pattern, the promise offered by the richness and
variety of the materials is not fully realized.

Lillian R. BeVier
Associate Professor of Law
University of Virginia
19. 42

u.s.c.

§§ 3601-19 (1970).

20. 387 U.S. 869 (1967).

